Can a change in strategy from attack to
prioritised defence limit the losses of our worst
fires?
By Damien Killalea, Director of Community
Fire Safety, Tasmania Fire Service
In its Interim Report, the Bushfires Royal
Commission has made it clear that the provision of warnings to
communities was inadequate and this meant many civilians received
little or no warning of the impending fire impact, and many of them
subsequently perished in the fires.
It is not yet clear what other findings the
Commission will make in relation to operational strategies on Black
Saturday, particularly in relation to the priorities incident
management teams (IMTs) assigned to their firefighting crews for
the protection of life and property. The events of that day, and
what we now know about what happened, give us all cause to stop and
reassess whether our approach to fighting fires is as strategically
savvy as it could be.
Are we doing all we can to protect
people and the communities they live in? Or have we let our
propensity to jump in boots and all to fight the fire cloud
our judgement on what the actual priority is? The interim
report from counsel assisting the Commission reinforced
“the necessity to give primacy to the protection of
life”. If we accept this principle, and no one would
argue that we should not, it provides a focus for the
strategies and objectives to be adopted by firefighters when
lives are threatened. It then follows that the protection of
assets not directly protecting people are of secondary
importance.
While the principle of “give primacy to
the protection of life” doesn’t change for different
fire scenarios, the way this is achieved under different bushfire
intensities does need to vary.
On days of low to moderate (and sometimes high)
fire potential, fire size and/or rate of spread is moderate, the
risk to human life is low and there are usually sufficient
resources to defend all threatened assets as they are being
threatened. On such days, resources can be deployed to defend
threatened assets and to halt the spread of fire.
On days of severe to catastrophic fire
potential, when fire spread cannot be stopped and there are
insufficient resources to defend all assets that need defending,
resources should be deployed to address a set of defined
priorities.
1. The primary priority of fire agencies should
be to gather, analyse and disseminate information to warn
communities of approaching danger. Intelligence needs to be
gathered on the predicted fire location, direction and rate of
spread, and timely warnings issued to those threatened by fire. The
role and staffing of the information unit of the IMT will need to
be reviewed and strengthened, so that the focus is not solely on
collecting information for operational purposes.
How these warnings are to be delivered to
people needs to be considered. Increasingly, use of the internet to
inform both the media and the general public is gaining acceptance
and the speed at which warnings can be delivered can be increased
if IMTs can upload information directly to websites and out through
other formats.
However given that we know internet traffic can
cause websites to fail on busy days, the mobile phone network can
be compromised and radio communications can be overwhelmed,
alternative ways of getting warnings to the public need to be
developed.
Warnings need to be consistent with the
national position on bushfire community safety, which will change
to reflect new fire danger indices of severe (50-75), extreme
(75-100) and catastrophic (>100). Particularly given that for an
index above 100, people will be encouraged to leave their homes for
safer places, rather than encouraged to stay and defend them.
2. The second priority should be the
protection of vulnerable people who may be gathered in
schools, nursing homes, community shelters and the like. This
necessitates the identification and assessment before the fire
season of sites in the community likely to be housing or
sheltering vulnerable people, and the assignment of crews to
focus on the protection of these sites and their occupants if
fires threaten.
Making community refuges known to the public
before the fire season will be a priority. These refuges should be
used by those who plan to leave and have left it too late to leave
safely for more distant places, for the significant numbers who
‘wait and see’ and subsequently flee at the last
minute, and for those who plan to stay and realise that they are
underprepared.
3. The third priority should be the protection
of key community assets that have been identified as such by the
community. These may include flagship industries or businesses, on
which the community relies, shopping centres, schools, hospitals,
power facilities, churches, historic buildings, the local pub and
other significant places. Protecting these assets improves
community resilience as it enables communities to recover more
quickly from bushfires as the major infrastructure is still intact.
It necessitates the identification of assets that particular
community’s value, mitigation of their vulnerability, and the
assignment of crews to protect them when fires threaten.
4. The fourth priority should be to stop the
spread of fire in built-up areas through building-to-building
ignitions. Options to enable this to be done rapidly should be
explored so that resources are not tied up for extended periods at
individual homes or buildings. The protection of homes in built-up
areas should result in fewer losses than seeking to protect the
same number of homes scattered over the landscape, and therefore
should be a higher priority for firefighters.
5. The fifth: defend ‘homes defendable by
firefighters’ particularly in areas of moderate to high
housing density, where firefighting resources can move relatively
quickly between homes and other assets under threat. Firefighters
should not defend homes that cannot be defended safely, or homes
that can be defended safely by civilians who are present. Use of a
triage system to assess house defendability before a fire can
identify those that firefighters can defend.
It may be possible that firefighters
are available to defend widely scattered homes where residents
have remained to defend homes that are undefendable or cannot
be defended without firefighter assistance. However, it is
hoped that these will be few, as most residents should either
be well prepared and able to defend their homes without
assistance, or should have responded to warnings issued
earlier and relocated to safe places.
Only when the defence of higher priority assets
are well resourced should firefighters be allocated to identify
homes that should be defended by firefighters in accordance with
triage policy. However, on days when fires are burning out of
control and the focus is on protecting life and valuable community
assets, protecting homes that are not sheltering people should be a
low priority for firefighters.
6. The final priority should be to fight the
fire, particularly for fires burning under severe to catastrophic
conditions. Under these conditions, fires extinguished in the bush
are likely to re-ignite, and any efforts to extinguish them are
likely to be fruitless. People and highly valued assets should be
protected consistent with the above priorities.
Only when conditions have moderated should
attention turn to containing and extinguishing the fire.
This approach means that on days when fires are
burning out of control and threatening multiple assets
simultaneously, isolated homes are unlikely to be defended (even if
a triage system identifies them as defendable) due to the
allocation of resources to higher priorities.
The public needs to be educated about
firefighters’ priorities on days of severe to catastrophic
fire danger so that individual householders can make informed
choices about the options they have for fires burning under these
conditions. Many, particularly those on isolated properties, who
are likely to stay and defend their properties on low/moderate fire
danger days, are likely to leave on severe to catastrophic fire
danger days if they are aware that the defence of their properties
by firefighters will be a low priority.
It will be essential to ensure adequate
arrangements are in place to support the provision of timely
warnings.
There will be a transition from tactics
employed on low/moderate fire danger days to the tactics employed
on days when fires burn out of control that will need to be thought
through. That is, the triggers for ‘falling back’ from
offensive strategies to defensive strategies need to be identified
and well understood by incident controllers, divisional commanders
and sector and crew leaders. The trigger is likely to be a function
of the fire danger index in a particular region, or the incapacity
of firefighters to control a particular fire.
This approach to defending people and property
via prioritisation should be based on one that deals in principles
(rather than rules) and focusses on achieving objectives. Provided
that operational personnel understand the principles and the
objectives, they can continue to operate reasonably effectively
even when communications break down or when fire crews are cut off
and need to act independently.
An approach, based on prioritisation of tasks
and assets, is not inconsistent with the current national position
on community safety in bushfires. It also addresses the
Commission’s criticisms that national community safety
positions are ‘home-centric’. With this approach,
community safety initiatives are people-centric and protection of
homes and buildings is viewed through the prism of how those
buildings protect people and the communities they live in.
(This article first appeared in the Summer
2009/10 issue of Fire Australia magazine.)